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INTRODUCTION
In the last twenty years, the mandatory death penalty
(“MDP”) in the Commonwealth Caribbean2 has evolved due to
recurrent scrutiny at the national and regional levels.  While
undoubtedly the judicial erosion of the MDP marks an impressive
human rights trend in the region, the trajectory of this change has
been complex and frequently discussed.3  The proceedings of The
1. Jane E. Cross is an Associate Professor and Director of the Caribbean Law
Programs at Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center.
2. Joanna Harrington, The Challenge to the Mandatory Death Penalty in the
Commonwealth Caribbean, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 126, 126 n.2 (2004), explained that:
“The term ‘Commonwealth Caribbean’ refers to a regional grouping of independent
states that share political and historical links to the United Kingdom through their
former colonial status and are currently members of the international organization
now known simply as “The Commonwealth.” The group includes Antigua and
Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, St. Kitts (also
known as St. Christopher) and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, as
well as Guyana and Belize, although these last two states are geographically part of
South and Central America, respectively.”
3. See, e.g., David A. C. Simmons, Q.C., Conflicts of Law and Policy in the
Caribbean-Human Rights and the Enforcement of the Death Penalty-Between a Rock
and a Hard Place, 9 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 263, 271 (2000); Harrington, supra note
2, at 126; Derrick V. McCoy, Identifying the Chi in Commonwealth Caribbean Law:
\\jciprod01\productn\I\IAL\46-1\IAL105.txt unknown Seq: 2 12-MAR-15 8:50
40 INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:1
Attorney General of Barbados versus Jeffrey Joseph (“Joseph”)
and Lennox Ricardo Boyce (“Boyce”) afforded an instructive explo-
ration of the judicial evolution of the MDP because they have
resulted in a review of four important areas of MDP jurispru-
dence: (1) the constitutionality of the MDP; (2) the deadlines for
appealing the imposition of the MDP; (3) the judicial review of
executive proceedings on clemency concerning the MDP; and (4)
the ability to petition international bodies for relief from the MDP.
The decisions of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
(“JCPC”) and the Caribbean Court of Justice (“CCJ”) in the Joseph
and Boyce Cases have illustrated the domestic and international
human rights implications of the MDP.4  In particular, the deci-
sion of the CCJ in the Joseph and Boyce matters (the “CCJ
Joseph-Boyce Case”) seeks to restore stability to judicial procedu-
ral mandates while establishing a means to achieve judicial scru-
tiny of executive prerogative to either enforce or set aside the
MDP.  What evolves from the CCJ’s restoration of this balance is
the creation of a judicial review mechanism that allows scrutiny of
the imposition of the death penalty and the preservation of access
to international forums.
In this manner, a review of the Boyce and Joseph Cases pro-
vides a comprehensive review, particularly for those who are unfa-
miliar with the history of MDP, into the maturation of the
jurisprudence surrounding the MDP in the Commonwealth Carib-
bean. Over a span of eight years, the appellant-defendants, Boyce
and Joseph, initiated appeals and petitions that resulted in judg-
ments from the JCPC,5 the CCJ6 and the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights (the “Inter-American Court”).7 The Boyce-Joseph
Cases illuminate the intricate evolution of Commonwealth Carib-
bean jurisprudence arising out of the need to reconcile the MDP
with evolving legal norms.8   The first set of appeals of this case in
The Contribution of the Common Law and Human Rights Law to Constitutional
Interpretation, 2-6 (Oct. 18, 2007), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=1021627.
4. Att’y Gen. v. Joseph, [2005] C.C.J. 2 (AJ) (Barb.) (de la Bastide, J. & Saunders,
J.) (hereinafter “Joseph”).
5. Boyce and Joseph v. The Queen, [2004] UKPC 32 (hereinafter “Boyce and
Joseph”).
6. Joseph, supra note 4, at 1.
7. Boyce et al. v. Barbados Case, 2007 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 169, (Nov.
20, 2007) (hereinafter “Boyce et al.”).
8. Dennis Morrison, The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and the Death
Penalty in the Commonwealth Caribbean: Studies in Judicial Activism, 30 NOVA L.
REV. 403, 411-23 (2006) (identifying the following areas of judicial activism by the
JCPC: (1) The impact of delay in carrying out a death sentence; (2) the determination
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Barbados led to a decision by the JCPC9 and a petition before the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (“Commission”)10
that later resulted in a judgment by the Inter-American Court.11
At about the same time that the Commission’s petition was sub-
mitted to the Inter-American Court, a second set of appeals
involving procedural issues in the case were being presented to
the newly inaugurated CCJ12. As a second stage in the appeals
process, the Boyce and Joseph Cases afforded the CCJ with the
opportunity to re-examine the constitutional and procedural
issues underlying the MDP and the interaction of these issues
with international treaty obligations. Moreover, the CCJ judg-
ment sought to resolve ongoing tensions between international
obligations and domestic law in a manner that re-asserted respect
for domestic sovereignty as a cornerstone of post-independence
Caribbean jurisprudence while enabling responsiveness to chang-
ing applications of international human rights norms.13
As such, the CCJ Joseph-Boyce Case provides an extensive
overview of the MDP in the Commonwealth Caribbean and
accordingly affords both an understanding of legal history in the
region and provides insight into the forces and causes that con-
tinue to shape the region’s emerging jurisprudence.14   Due to its
historical entrenchment, the law dealing with the MDP has
engendered significant evolutionary cornerstones in the Common-
wealth Caribbean jurisprudence.  Thus, the CCJ, through its
exploration of these evolving legal norms, has worked to reconcile
the constitutional idiosyncrasies and treaty obligations that have
framed MDP issues in the Commonwealth Caribbean.
of procedural fairness in the exercise of the prerogative of mercy; and (3) the
constitutionality of the mandatory death penalty).
9. See Boyce and Joseph, supra note 5.
10. See Boyce v. Barbados, Case 12.480, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R. (2006).
11. Boyce et al., supra note 7, at 8.
12. Joseph, supra note 4, at ¶ 1.
13. The lengthy procedural path of these cases and the resulting exploration of
death penalty jurisprudence provides insights into: (1) the historical and
constitutional nuances of the Commonwealth Caribbean Legal System; (2) the
reasons that Caribbean nations seek to replace the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council with the Caribbean Court of Justice; and (3) human rights evolution that
resulted from the reconciling the mandatory death sentence with changing legal
norms. An excellent resource for the discussion of the historical roots of the
Commonwealth Caribbean Legal System can be found in Rose-Marie Belle Antoine,
Commonwealth Caribbean Law and Legal Systems (2008).
14. For a discussion of the development and use of the term “Commonwealth
Caribbean Jurisprudence,” see McCoy, supra note 3, at 2-6.
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PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF THE
BOYCE-JOSEPH CASES:
An understanding of the legal importance of CCJ Joseph-
Boyce Case requires an overview of the background and procedu-
ral history of the proceedings in this matter. Following the convic-
tion of Boyce and Joseph in February 2001, the first series of
appeals ended in 2004 with the JCPC sitting in London as the
final court of appeal.15 The second set of appeals ended with a deci-
sion by CCJ established in April 2005 in Port of Spain, Trinidad.16
As this second group of appeals was being completed, Boyce and
Joseph also petitioned the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights in 2004 and received a judgment from the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights in 2007.  The factual background underly-
ing this complex procedural history is also quite compelling.
The Joseph-Boyce Case began with an unfortunate alterca-
tion between two young men. On April 10, 1999, Marquelle Hip-
polyte (“Hippolyte”) had a disagreement on a bus with Rodney
Murray (“Murray”).  After Hippolyte left the bus, Murray was hit
by a rock thrown by Hippolyte or one of his friends.  Later that
day, Hippolyte was pursued after being spotted on a basketball
court and was brutally beaten with rocks and wood planks in a
planned retaliation. The attackers were Murray, Romain Bend
(“Bend”), Jeffrey Joseph (“Joseph”), and Lennox Ricardo Boyce
(“Boyce).  Despite extensive medical treatment, Hippolyte later
died on April 15, 1999, from a brain hemorrhage and shock.17 On
January 10, 2001, Murray and Bend plead guilty to manslaughter
and were sentenced on February 27, 2001, to twelve years in
prison.18  On January 24, 2001, Joseph and Boyce plead not guilty
to murder.19  On February 2, 2001, Joseph and Boyce were found
guilty of murder and were sentenced to the mandatory death sen-
tence by hanging, in accordance with section 2 of Barbados’
Offences Against the Person Act of 1994.20
15. Simmons, supra note 3, at 265.
16. Barbados Rediffusion v. Mirchandani, [2006] C.C.J. 1 (AJ) (explaining how the
CCJ replaced the JCPC as the final court of appeals in Barbados).
17. Boyce et al., supra note 7, at 13 n.34; Final Written Submissions of the Alleged
Victims, Boyce et al. v. Barbados Case, 2007 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 169, at 14
(Aug. 13 2007); Bend and Murray v. the Queen (Criminal Appeals Nos. 19 and 20 of
2001, unreported decision of 27 March 2002) 1, http://www.lawcourts.gov.bb/
LawLibrary/events.asp?id=283 (hereinafter “Bend and Murray”).
18. Bend and Murray, supra note 17.
19. Final Written Submissions of the Alleged Victims, Boyce et al. v. Barbados
Case, 2007 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 169, at 14 (Aug. 13 2007).
20. Joseph, supra note 4, at ¶ 1. According to the Final Submissions of the Alleged
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On March 27, 2002, the Joseph and Boyce appeal to the Court
of Appeal of Barbados was dismissed.21  After this dismissal,
Joseph and Boyce communicated with the Governor-General of
Barbados about their intention to appeal their death sentences to
the JCPC.22
Nonetheless, the Barbados Privy Council (“BPC”)23 met on
June 24, 2002, and advised against commutation of the death
sentences.  As a result, death warrants were read to Boyce and
Joseph for the first time on June 26, 2002.  Following that, an
order was obtained from the High Court of Barbados staying the
execution on June 28, 2002, for a period of twenty-eight days
pending an appeal to the JCPC.24 On July 7, 2004, the JCPC
upheld (by a five-to-four majority) the constitutionality of the
MDP in Barbados, and dismissed the appeals of Joseph and
Boyce.25
On July 9, 2004, the counsel for Boyce and Joseph gave notice
of their intention to file an application before the Commission.26
Victims, “the Crown had indicated prior to trial that pleas of manslaughter would also
be acceptable from Boyce and Joseph, but they maintained their innocence and
elected to stand trial.”  Final Written Submissions of the Alleged Victims, Boyce et al.
v. Barbados Case, 2007 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 169, at 14 (Aug. 13 2007).
Justice Wit noted in his opinion that “The other two, the respondents, opted to be
tried on a charge of murder on the basis of a not guilty plea. They were convicted for
murder and subsequently and automatically sentenced to death. There are no facts to
suggest that the involvement of the respondents in the crime was more serious than
that of the other two. Joseph did have a criminal record, but an unimpressive one.
Boyce had no criminal record whatsoever. Reports by the prison authorities on their
behavior were in neither case unfavorable. The only relevant difference between the
respondents and their fellow accused seems to be that the latter spared the Crown the
time and costs of a trial.” Joseph, supra note 4, at ¶ 4 (Wit, J., concurring). See also
Offences Against The Person Act, 1994, 5 L.R.O. 1995, ch. 141, § 2 (Barb.).
21. Bend and Murray, supra note 17.
22. According to Justice Nelson, “On April 5, 2002 Joseph served the Barbados
Privy Council (“BPC”) with notice of his petition to the Privy Council for special leave
to appeal in forma pauperis.” As explained by President Micheal de la Bastide and
Justice Adrian Saunders of the Caribbean Court of Justice, “[c]ounsel [for Joseph and
Boyce] were repeatedly invited to make written submissions to the [BPC] but they
chose not to do so. Counsel’s position was that unless a commutation of the sentence
was being recommended, it was inappropriate for the BPC to meet given that the men
intended, and were actively preparing, to prosecute an appeal to the JCPC.” Joseph,
supra note 4, at ¶ 3 (Nelson, J.).
23. The function of the Barbados Privy Council is explained infra note 47.
24.  Joseph, supra note 4, at ¶ 4.
25. This case, Boyce v. The Queen, [2004] UKPC 32, is discussed infra note 61. As
noted below, this case is one of three mandatory death penalty cases decided on the
same day by the JCPC.
26. Final Written Submissions of the Alleged Victims, Boyce et al. v. Barbados
Case, 2007 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 169, at 30 (Aug. 13 2007).
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That application was filed on September 3, 2004, to obtain a decla-
ration that Boyce and Joseph suffered a violation of their rights
under the American Convention on Human Rights (“Conven-
tion”).27 Even though the BPC was informed of this filing on Sep-
tember 4, 2002, the BPC met on September 13, 2004, to consider
ramifications of the JCPC decision and advised “the Governor-
General that the death sentences should be carried out.”28 Two
days after that meeting, on September 15, 2004, death warrants
were read to Boyce and Joseph again for an execution scheduled
on September 21, 2004.29
The scheduled execution was once again stayed pending a
motion made on September 16, 2004, before the High Court of
Barbados to seek, among other things, a commutation of death
sentences.30  Similarly, on September 17, 2004, the Commission
accepted a petition submitted on behalf of Boyce and Joseph and
also applied to the Inter-American Court for the issuance of provi-
sional measures regarding Barbados.31  On that same day, the
President of the Inter-American Court issued an order for provi-
sional measures “[t]o require the State to adopt, without delay, all
of the necessary measures to preserve the life and physical integ-
rity of Lennox Boyce and Jeffrey Joseph, so as not to hinder the
27. Joseph, supra note 4, at ¶ 5; Final Written Submissions of the Alleged Victims,
Boyce et al. v. Barbados Case, 2007 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 169 at 30 (Nov. 20,
2007). See also Emilio A´lvarez Icaza, Exec. Sec’y of the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights, The Inter-American System and Challenges for Its Future,
Fifteenth Annual Grotius Lecture (April 3, 2014) (transcript published by American
Society of International Law) (“A majority of the member states of the Organization of
American States abolished capital punishment, but a substantial minority retain it.
The Commission, at its motion, and the Court, have dealt with the practice of the
obligatory imposition of the death penalty upon conviction for murder in a number of
countries in the Caribbean and have concluded that its automatic imposition, without
considering the individual circumstances of the offense or the offender, is
incompatible with the rights to life, humane treatment, and due process. The
standards developed as a result, and the interaction between the inter-American
human rights bodies and the judicial bodies of the Commonwealth Caribbean, have
given rise to unprecedented changes in law and policy. At present, only two of those
countries retain the mandatory death penalty, and one of those is in the process of
reforming it in compliance with decisions of the organs of the Inter-American
System.”).
28. Joseph, supra note 4, at ¶5; Final Written Submissions of the Alleged Victims,
Boyce et al. v. Barbados Case, 2007 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 169, at 30 (Aug.
13, 2007).
29. Id.
30. Id. ¶ 6.
31. Boyce et al., supra note 7, at 8.
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processing of their cases before the Inter-American system.”32  The
Inter-American Court ratified the President’s Provisional Order
on November 25, 2004, nearly a month before the Barbados High
Court had ruled on the motions previously made by Boyce and
Joseph.33
On December 22, 2004, the Barbados High Court dismissed
the two motions that accompanied the stays of execution granted
in June and September 2004, and issued a six-week extension of
the stay of execution, pending the filing of another appeal with the
Barbados Court of Appeal.34  After the filing of that appeal, the
Court of Appeals extended the stay of execution for Boyce and
Joseph until the appeal’s conclusion.35 On May 31, 2005, the Bar-
bados Court of Appeals ordered the death sentences commuted
and substituted for a sentence of life imprisonment.36
On June 20-21, 2006, the Attorney General’s appeal of the
Barbados Court of Appeals decision was heard before the newly
inaugurated Caribbean Court of Justice, which replaced the JCPC
as Barbados’ final court of appeal.37  Two days later on June 23,
2006, the Commission submitted to the Inter-American Court an
application against the State of Barbados based on the petition
submitted on September 3, 2004.38 On November 8, 2006, the Car-
ibbean Court of Justice delivered its opinion, which ultimately dis-
missed the appeal of the commutation of the death sentences.39
Just over a year later, on November 20, 2007, the Inter-American
Court issued its judgment finding that Barbados violated the
rights of Boyce and Joseph under the American Convention on
Human Rights.40
Mandatory Death Penalty as a Colonial Institution
The extensive procedural history surrounding the Boyce and
Joseph cases epitomize the human rights tension resulting from
32. Id. at Provisional Measures, Resolution of the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights of November 25, 2004, fourth “Considering.”
33. Id. at 8.
34. Joseph, supra note 4, at ¶ 10 (Nelson, J.).
35. Id.
36. Boyce et al., supra note 7, at 5 n.13 (citing Jeffrey Joseph and Lennox Ricardo
Boyce v. The AG et al., Civil Appeal No. 29 of 2004 (May 31, 2005)).
37. On April 16, 2005, the Caribbean Court of Justice was inaugurated. See
Caribbeancourtofjustice.org; The CCJ from Concept to Reality http://www.caribbean
courtofjustice.org/about-the-ccj/ccj-concept-to-reality (last visited May 29, 2012).
38. See Boyce et al., supra note 7, at 1.
39. See Joseph, supra note 4.
40. See Boyce et al., supra note 7.
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the preservation of a colonial criminal penalty.  At independence,
Commonwealth Caribbean nations preserved the mandated pen-
alty for the crime of murder, which is death by hanging.41  Accord-
ingly, the MDP for murder was preserved by including “existing
law” or “savings law” clauses in the Commonwealth Caribbean
Constitutions.42  Without those clauses, imposing a sentence of
death without considering mitigating circumstances at trial could
be found to be “inhuman or degrading punishment” in contraven-
tion of the fundamental rights and freedoms provisions expressed
in their constitutions adopted at independence.43
By Constitution, mitigating circumstances in mandatory
death sentence cases are considered post-trial.44  As the represen-
tative of Her Majesty the Queen, the Governor-General45 makes
the decision on whether (1) to carry out the sentence of death, or
41. See Boyce and Joseph, supra note 5; see also David A. C. Simmons, Q.C.,
Conflicts of Law and Policy in the Caribbean-Human Rights and the Enforcement of
the Death Penalty-Between a Rock and a Hard Place, 9 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 263,
265 (2000) (“In the same way the right to life is statute-based, so too is the death
penalty. Section 2 of the Offences Against The Person Act provides that ‘[a]ny person
convicted of murder shall be sentenced to, and suffer, death.’ This provision predated
Independence and a written Constitution that came into force on November 30, 1966.
The Constitution of Barbados itself contemplates the death penalty. Section 12(1)
states: ‘No person shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in execution of the
sentence of a court in respect of a criminal offence under the law of Barbados of which
he has been convicted.’”).
42. See Boyce and Joseph, supra note 5, at ¶ 30; see also Saul Lehrfreund,
International Legal Trends and the ‘Mandatory’ Death Penalty in the Commonwealth
Caribbean, 1 OXFORD U. COMMW. L.J. 171, 171 (2001) (“Savings clauses operate in all
jurisdictions of the Commonwealth Caribbean, except Belize, to preserve the colonial
status quo from constitutional challenge.  Either they rule out altogether any
constitutional attack on the laws in existence at the time of independence, or they at
least prohibit any attack on the specific colonial penalties or punishments in existence
at the time of independence based on the alleged cruelty or inhumanity of those
punishments.”).
43. See Boyce and Joseph, supra note 5, at ¶ 74; see also Simmons, supra note 3, at
264-65 (2000) (“The right to life is guaranteed in Section 11 of Chapter III of the
Constitution of Barbados, which is devoted to provisions for the protection of
fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual. This right to life is, however,
subject to limitations. Section 11 specifically provides that the limitations are
‘designed to ensure that the enjoyment of the said rights and freedoms by any
individual does not prejudice the rights and freedoms of others or the public interest.’
In other words, the right to life must yield to a competing public interest in certain
circumstances. Chapter III was greatly influenced by the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1953). That Convention
was in turn influenced by the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights
of 1948 (citations omitted)).“
44. BARB. CONST. § 78 (3).
45. Id. § 78 (1); “Even after independence, the Governor-General is appointed by
and serves at the pleasure of Her Majesty, the Queen of England, and is Her
Majesty’s representative in Barbados.” Id. at § 28.
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(2) to exercise the prerogative of mercy to (a) grant clemency, or
(b) commute the death sentence to life imprisonment.46  In making
that decision, the Governor-General is advised by a non-judicial
appointed body known as the Privy Council.47  Moreover, an
“ouster clause” in the Barbados Constitution purportedly shielded
Privy Council decisions from judicial review.48 These inherited
colonial laws and institutions that preserve the MDP in the Com-
monwealth Caribbean began to garner the attention of the inter-
national human rights community, and as a result, these
governments felt pressured to conform to international human
rights obligations in domestic proceedings. Thus, the Joseph and
Boyce cases show the contours of the judicial erosion of the colo-
nial jurisprudential relics of MDP in the Commonwealth Carib-
bean and the invocation of more innovative jurisprudential
trends.49 Accordingly, the Joseph and Boyce cases have reviewed
and highlighted many of the constitutional and procedural
landmarks that now define an emergent interdependent nexus in
Commonwealth Caribbean human rights and jurisprudence.
USING THE JOSEPH AND BOYCE CASES TO EXAMINE THE
VAGARY OF JUDICIAL COMMITTEE OF PRIVY COUNCIL
DECISIONS ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF THE MANDATORY DEATH PENALTY
The first set of appeals of the Joseph and Boyce matter were
one of a two-part series of appeals challenging the constitutional-
ity of the MDP in the JCPC. In two trios of landmark cases in
2002 and 2004, the JCPC examined the constitutionality of the
MDP. In the 2002 cases, the JCPC observed that the MDP laws in
46. See Boyce and Joseph, supra note 5, at ¶¶ 21, 23.
47. See id. ¶ 21; the members of the Privy Council in Barbados are appointed by
the Governor-General in consultation with the Prime Minister. BARB. CONST. § 76
(3c).  Due to its functions, the Privy Council is also known as the Barbados Mercy
Committee or the Barbados Prerogative of Mercy Committee.
48. BARB. CONST. § 77 (4) (stating “[t]he question whether the Privy Council has
validly performed any function vested in it by this Constitution shall not be inquired
into any court”).
49. See Harrington, supra note 2, at 130 (noting that “[t]he mandatory death
penalty is a colonial legacy. Under the common law of England, death was the only
sentence that could be pronounced by judge upon a defendant who was convicted of
murder, regardless of the nature of the offense or the particular circumstances of the
offender. Through colonialism, this simple and undiscriminating rule was applied to
many of Britain’s colonies, and upon independence, the nations of the Commonwealth
Caribbean preserved the rule that was in place as part of their colonial inheritance.”
(citations omitted)).
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the Commonwealth Caribbean countries ran afoul of the human
rights principles embodied in their constitutions at indepen-
dence.50   To make that determination, the JCPC examined
whether the “pre-existing laws” provisions or “savings clause” in
the respective Commonwealth Caribbean Constitutions ade-
quately shielded their MDP laws from constitutional scrutiny.51
In three cases in 2002 and a fourth in 2003, the JCPC opined that
MDP sentences were unconstitutional in four Commonwealth
Caribbean nations.  In Reyes v. The Queen, the Board stated that
“[t]o deny the offender the opportunity, before sentence is passed,
to seek to persuade the court that in all the circumstances to con-
demn him to death would be disproportionate and inappropriate is
to treat him as no human being should be treated and thus to
deny his basic humanity. . .”52  Along these lines, the JCPC upheld
the death penalty, but not as a mandatory sentence.  The result of
those ruling was summarized in the dissenting opinion for Mat-
thew v. The State,53 a companion case to Boyce and Joseph v. The
Queen as follows:
In Reyes v. The Queen [2002] 2 AC 235, R v. Hughes [2002]
UKPC 12, [2002] 2 AC 259 and Fox v The Queen [2002]
UKPC 13, [2002] 2 AC 284 modifications were made to the
laws of Belize, St Lucia and St Christopher and Nevis
respectively which did not outlaw the death penalty but
substituted a discretion to impose sentence of death in
appropriate cases for a mandatory duty to impose it.  A
similar course was followed, in our view rightly, by a major-
ity of the Board in Roodal v. State of Trinidad and Tobago
[2003] UKPC 78, [2004] 2 WLR 652.54
Decided less than a year after Roodal, Boyce and Joseph v.
The Queen55 indicated an odd reversal of the JCPC’s trend in strik-
ing down the MDP.  In Boyce and Joseph, Lord Hoffman, writing
for the majority, noted that, “the effect of the Roodal decision was
to lay open the whole of the pre-independence law of Barbados to
challenge. . ..”56 Re-examining its decision in Roodal, the majority
50. See Reyes v. The Queen, [2002] UKPC 11, ¶ 1 [2002] 2 A.C. 235 (appeal taken
from Belize).
51. See Morrison, supra note 8, at 419-23.
52. Reyes, [2002] UKPC 11 at ¶ 43.
53. Matthew v. The State, [2004] UKPC 33, [2005] 1 A.C. 433 (appeal taken from
Trin. & Tobago).
54. See Boyce and Joseph, supra note 5, at ¶ 53.
55. Roodal, Boyce and Joseph v. The Queen, [2004] UKPC 32, [2005] 1 A.C. 400
(appeal taken from Barb.)
56. Id. ¶ 62.
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in Boyce and Joseph held that the MDP in Barbados was, in fact,
enforceable due to the existing law provision in the Barbados Con-
stitution.57 The “saving of existing law” provision in section 26 of
the Barbados Constitution protects written laws enacted prior to
independence even when those laws are modified.58  The majority
explained that the MDP was written into section 2 of the Barba-
dos Offences Against the Person Act 1868, which reads in part,
“whosoever shall be convicted of murder shall suffer death as a
felon.”59  After independence in 1966, the Offences Against the
Person Act 1994 replaced the 1868 act.60 Thus, the MDP in the
1994 act was protected as existing law even though the Board
found that it was not consistent with the constitutional prohibi-
tion against inhuman and degrading punishment.61  The majority
also noted that “the mandatory death penalty is inconsistent with
the international obligations of Barbados” but that those obliga-
tions do not “have any direct effect upon the domestic law of Bar-
bados.”62 Accordingly, the majority recognized that preserving the
MDP was contrary to evolving international norms.
57. Id. ¶ 6.
58. The saving of existing law provision in section 26 of the Barbados Constitution
reads:
“1. Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any written
law shall be held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of any
provision of sections 12 to 23 to the extent that the law in question -
a. is a law (in this section referred to as ‘an existing law’) that
was enacted or made before 30th November 1966 and has
continued to be part of the law of Barbados at all times since
that day;
b. repeals and re-enacts an existing law without alteration; or
c. alters an existing law and does not thereby render that law
inconsistent with any provision of sections 12 to 23 in a manner
in which, or to an extent to which, it was not previously so
inconsistent.
2. In subsection (1)(c) the reference to altering and existing law
includes references to repealing it and re-enacting it with
modifications or making different provisions in lieu thereof, and to
modifying it; and in subsection (1) ‘written law’ includes any
instrument having the force of law and in this subsection and
subsection (1) references to the repeal and re-enactment of an
existing law shall be construed accordingly.”
59. Relevant language from the 1868 statute reads “whosoever shall be convicted
of murder shall suffer death as a felon.” Id. ¶ 8 (quoting Section 2 of the Barbados
Offences Against the Person Act 1868).
60. Offences Against the Person Act, 1994, §2 (Barb.) (The relevant language now
reads: “[a]ny person convicted of murder shall be sentenced to, and suffer, death.”).
61. Boyce v. The Queen, [2004] UKPC 32 ¶ 6, [2005] 1 A.C. 400 (appeal taken from
Barb.) (referencing the BARB. CONST. § 15(1)).
62. Id. ¶ 25.
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With respect to the majority’s interpretation of the existing
law provision and the preservation of the mandatory death sen-
tence, the dissenting Lordships stated:
This is no doubt a possible reading of these provisions.  But
it is not the only possible reading.  Nor, in our opinion, is it
the preferable reading. It puts a narrow and over-literal
construction on the words used, gives little or no weight to
the principles which should guide the approach to interpre-
tation of constitutional provisions, gives little or no weight
to the human rights guarantees which the people of Barba-
dos intended to embed in their Constitution and puts Bar-
bados in flagrant breach of its international obligations.63
To remedy those transgressions, the dissenting Lordships
explained that “we would modify section 2 of the Offences Against
the Person Act 1994 by substituting ‘may’ for ‘shall.’ ”64
The majority and dissenting opinion in Matthew divided along
the same lines as the Boyce and Joseph case.  Lord Hoffman writ-
ing for the majority explained:
In its judgment delivered today in Boyce and Joseph v. The
Queen the Board has rejected the reasoning in Roodal and
decided that the law imposing a mandatory death penalty
for murder in Barbados remains valid.  Their Lordships do
not propose to repeat all that was said in their judgment in
that case, to which reference should be made.  They will
confine themselves to setting out the relevant legislation in
Trinidad and Tobago and explaining why the reasoning in
Boyce and Joseph v. The Queen also leads to the conclusion
that the law imposing the mandatory death penalty for
murder in Trinidad and Tobago remains valid.65
Thus, the majority in Matthew plainly stated that this 2004
decision expressly overruled its 2003 decision in Roodal, conse-
quently reinstating the MDP in Trinidad and Tobago.66  On the
basis of the majority decisions Boyce and Joseph and Matthew, it
would not have been surprising if the JCPC had also upheld the
MDP law in Jamaica. What was perplexing to those who did fol-
low the reasoning in these cases is why the JCPC decided not to
uphold MDP in Jamaica.
In Watson v. The Queen, the Board acknowledged that it was
63. Id. ¶ 78.
64. Id. ¶ 82.
65. Matthew v. The State, [2004] UKPC 33 ¶ 10, [2005] 1 A.C. 433.
66. Id. ¶ 7.
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making an incongruent decision by stating “[i]t is said that the
outcome in this appeal, as compared with the result in those two
cases [Boyce and Joseph and Matthew], is anomalous.”67  The
JCPC explained that the different result was due to the applicabil-
ity of the existing law provisions in each case.  The JCPC distin-
guished its holdings by noting that: “[i]n Matthew and in Boyce
and Joseph the laws in question are existing laws.  In the present
case the law in question is not.”68  Unlike the new legislation in
Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica amended the
Offences Against the Person Act of 1864 with the Offences Against
the Person (Amendment) Act 1992.  In the 1992 act, the
mandatory death sentence was limited to cases of “capital mur-
der” or multiple “non-capital” murders.  In examining the new
law, the JCPC found that the MDP for repeat non-capital murder
was not “existing law” and therefore the MDP set forth in that
part of the act was unconstitutional.  As a result, the 1992 act
would be read to authorize, but not require the death penalty for
non-capital murder.
These strange constructions are difficult to explain and
understand. On the one hand, the JCPC has upheld MDP even
though it is contrary to the provisions of Commonwealth Carib-
bean constitutions and evolving international norms.  On the
other hand, the JCPC recognized that the continued application of
saving law or existing law clauses has a petrifying effect on the
evolution of fundamental rights and has stalled the application of
constitutional and international principles to the MDP.  Thus, the
JCPC’s decisions show the difficulty in applying the existing law
clauses in the Commonwealth Caribbean.  The questions of what
law existed and whether it is preserved after amendment is not
simple.  In particular, the notion of preserving the validity of colo-
nial, antiquated laws seems to grate against the development of
post-independence legal systems.  While the JCPC has had some
difficulty balancing the conflicting considerations in the Common-
wealth Caribbean norms, the CCJ has worked to strike a more
comprehensible balance between the constraints of an inherited
colonial legal system and progressive notions of fundamental
rights.
67. Watson v. The Queen, [2004] UKPC 34 ¶ 51, [2005] 1 A.C. 472 (appeal taken
from Jam.).
68. Id. ¶ 52.
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BOYCE-JOSEPH TIMELINE AND JCPC DEADLINES
In addition to questions of constitutionality, the JCPC in
Pratt and Morgan v. The Attorney General69 created a five-year
deadline for carrying out the MDP after sentencing.  The CCJ
noted that Barbados had already conceded the commutation of the
death sentence and that the point was therefore not fully argued.
By the time the Boyce-Joseph appeal to the CCJ in 2006, “[o]ver
five years had elapsed since their conviction and sentence.”70
Regardless of that lapse and the fact that Barbados Attorney Gen-
eral “made no attempt to challenge the applicability to them of the
time-limit for carrying out the death penalty laid down in Pratt
and Morgan”71, the CCJ took the opportunity to review the five-
year deadline in the Pratt decision in light of the difficulty created
by the JCPC decision in Lewis v. The Attorney General of
Jamaica.72 President de la Bastide and Justice Saunders began
their review by observing that Pratt was “a decision of the JCPC,
delivered in 1993, [that] had a seismic effect on capital punish-
ment jurisprudence in the Commonwealth Caribbean.”73 These
two Justices then interpreted the five-year limitation established
by Pratt as follows:
A period of five years following sentence was established as
a reasonable, though not by any means inflexible, time-
69. Simmons, supra note 3, at 271 (“[t]he immediate result of the decision in Pratt
was that all Caribbean jurisdictions, which had prisoners on death row in excess of
five years, had to commute their sentences to life imprisonment“).
70. Joseph, supra note 4, at ¶ 15.  In addition, the Justices observed that “the time
permitted by Pratt for their execution has already expired and the commutation of
their death sentences is no longer challenged. However, the matter is too important
and too contentious to shelve on that basis. It was fully argued in the courts below
and before us and the parties are entitled to have our ruling on it.” Id. ¶ 50.
71. Id. ¶ 15.
72. Lewis v. Attorney General, [2001] 2 A.C. 50 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Jam.).
In Lewis, the JCPC stated that the 18-month period allotted to receive a report from
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights should not increase the five-year
period established in Pratt, [2001] 2 A.C. 50 (P.C.). Referencing Jamaican cases in a
discussion about a Barbadian case is not unusual given that the JCPC applies the
reasoning of cases originating from another Commonwealth Caribbean nation when
similar constitutional provisions merit such an application. See ROSE-MARIE BELLE
ANTOINE, COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEMS, 119 (Routledge-
Cavendish ed., 2nd ed. 2008) (stating that  “[i]n the Commonwealth Caribbean,
precedents from other Commonwealth Caribbean jurisdictions and the UK are
usually highly persuasive.”).
73. Joseph, supra note 4, at ¶¶ 45-46. The Justices noted that “[t]he decision
caused disruption in national and regional justice systems. Its effect was that, in one
fell swoop, all persons on death row for longer than five years were automatically
entitled to have, and had, their sentences commuted to life imprisonment. In Jamaica
there were 105 such prisoners, in Trinidad & Tobago 53, and in Barbados 9.” Id.
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limit within which the entire post-sentence legal process
should be completed and the execution carried out. If exe-
cution was not carried out within that time-frame, there
was a strong likelihood that the court would regard the
delay as amounting to inhuman treatment and commute
the death sentence to one of life imprisonment.74
Within the Pratt case, the JCPC had allotted two years for
“the entire appellate process” and another eighteen months “for
applications to international bodies.”75 Despite the initial impact
of these time limits, the CCJ opted to uphold the five-year time-
limit established in Pratt by noting “[w]e respectfully endorse
without reservation the proposition that the practice of keeping
persons on death row for inordinate periods of time, is unaccept-
able and infringes constitutional provisions that guarantee
humane treatment.”76
The two Justices also examined the timing dilemma created
by the Lewis case.  According to the Justices:
the JCPC decided inter alia, that, where a State has rati-
fied a treaty conferring on individuals the right to petition
an international human rights body, a person sentenced to
death by a court of that State is entitled by virtue of his
constitutional right to the protection of the law, to require
that the sentence of death passed on him be not carried out
until his petition to the human rights body has been finally
disposed of and the report of that body is available for con-
sideration by the State authority charged with exercising
the prerogative of mercy.77
Given that the international obligations identified in Lewis must
also be satisfied within the Pratt deadlines, the resulting procedu-
ral hurdles were more difficult to clear because the state has “no
control over the pace of proceedings before the relevant interna-
tional human rights body.”78
Despite the political fallout and debate sparked by Pratt and
Lewis, ultimately, the CCJ declined to overrule the Pratt deci-
sion.79 Instead, the de la Bastide and Saunders opinion indicated
that proceedings protected by Lewis could exceed the specified
74. Id. ¶ 45.
75. Id.
76. Id. ¶ 47.
77. Id. ¶ 48.
78. Joseph, supra note 4, at ¶ 48.
79. For a more detailed discussion of the impact of and the rationale for the Pratt
decision, see generally Morrison, supra note 8.
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eighteen-month period and the overall five-year limit in Pratt.
Thus, flexibility in the application these deadlines would be per-
mitted if “the additional time taken is not attributable to delays in
the process for which the Government concerned is responsible.“80
The CCJ also addressed whether the Barbados Court of
Appeal was correct in its decision to commute the death sentence
in the Joseph-Boyce appeal of the BPC attempt to act prior to a
petition to the Inter-American Commission.  The Justices agreed
that commutation was appropriate because to resort to the Inter-
American Court would have “taken the case over the five-year
limit set in Pratt, as applied in Lewis, both of which were at the
material time the law of Barbados.”81 Even if the CCJ had over-
turned precedent to extend the Pratt and Lewis timelines, the
Justices opined that they could not re-impose the sentence of
death.  In explaining this decision, the Justices stated that
another set of expectations arises when, by application of a court
decision, a death sentence is commuted.  The “special features of
[this] expectation” are as follows,
Firstly, it is the expectation of a person under sentence of
death. Secondly, it is an expectation created not by the
Executive, but by a court decision which is subsequently
reversed. Thirdly, the expectation is that the condemned
man will be given a chance (however slim) of avoiding being
put to death. To deny the condemned man that chance was
deemed so unfair as to render the carrying out of the death
sentence cruel and, therefore, unconstitutional.82
Thus, the CCJ opined that Barbados correctly conceded the
commutation of the death penalty in accordance with the decision
of the Barbados Court of Appeals.83
THE CARIBBEAN COURT OF JUSTICE DECISION
ON BOYCE AND JOSEPH
The Barbados Court of Appeals was reviewing the decision of
the BPC to take action in the Boyce-Joseph matter before there
was an opportunity to petition to the Inter-American Commission
80. Joseph, supra note 4, at ¶ 138.
81. Id. ¶ 133.
82. Id. ¶ 136 (referring to the majority opinion in Matthew v. The State, [2004]
UKPC 33, [2005] 1 A.C. 433 (appeal taken from Trin. & Tobago)).
83. Id. ¶ 15; see also id., at ¶ 33 (Nelson, J.) (stating that the question of whether
commutation of the death sentence was proper under Pratt was academic in light of
the state’s concession of its application).
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in order to be heard by the Inter-American Court.  These actions
of the BPC after the JCPC decision on the constitutionality of the
MDP resulted in the Boyce and Joseph case being appealed to the
CCJ.  The three issues before the CCJ were (1) whether the BPC’s
decision subject to judicial review; (2) whether the BPC’s failure to
await the outcome of the petition to the Inter-American Commis-
sion violated Joseph’s and Boyce’s right to protection under the
law and (3) whether the Barbados Constitution allowed the Court
of Appeals to commute a death sentence and if so whether the fac-
tors considered were appropriate.84
In 2002, Barbados had amended its constitution to allow the
BPC, among other things, (1) to set deadlines for appeals to or
consultations with institutions or persons outside the Barbados
appellate process and (2) to exercise its functions before the com-
pletion of those appeals or consultations.85  As noted by the CCJ,
“these amendments were prompted by dissatisfaction on the part
of the people of Barbados with certain decisions of the JCPC and
the resolve of the Barbados Parliament to restrict at least, if not
negate, the effects of these decisions.”86 Applying these amend-
ments, the BPC met and advised against the commutation of the
death sentence before the Inter-American Commission had acted
on the Boyce-Joseph petition.87
In reviewing the acts of the BPC, both the High Court and the
Court of Appeals in Barbados found that the BPC could not meet
before the conclusion of the Commission’s proceedings. Moreover,
the Court of Appeals also indicated that courts could set aside the
BPC decisions or have declared them null.88
The decision by the Barbados Court of Appeals raised the
question of whether the BPC decisions about the exercise the pre-
rogative of mercy were subject to judicial review. Section 77(4) of
the Barbados Constitution, known as the “ouster clause”, provides
that: “[t]he question whether the Privy Council has validly per-
formed any function vested in it by this Constitution shall not be
inquired into by any court.”89  In addition, earlier JCPC cases indi-
cated that since “mercy was not the subject of legal rights . . . the
84. Id. ¶ 11.
85. BARB. CONST. § 78 (6).
86. Joseph, supra note 4, at ¶ 23.
87. The CCJ also noted that Boyce and Joseph “were convicted and sentenced
before the amendments came into force but it was submitted in writing on their
behalf that the new sub-sections applied to them.” Id.
88. Id. ¶ 9.
89. BARB. CONST. § 77 (4).
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prerogative of mercy was therefore not subject to review by the
courts.”90 President de la Bastide and Justice Saunders noted that
shielding the exercise of the prerogative of mercy from judicial
review runs contrary to “the modern approach to human rights
with its emphasis on procedural fairness.”91 In addition, they
observed that more recent JCPC decisions have found that “the
processes involved in the exercise of mercy were not beyond
review by the courts.”92 The Justices indicated their approval of
this view by explaining:
We agree with those who regard the power to confirm or
commute a death sentence, particularly a mandatory one,
as far too important to permit those in whom it is vested
freedom to exercise that power without any possibility of
judicial review even if they commit breaches of basic rules
of procedural fairness.93
In addition, the ouster clause, in Section 77(4), did not preclude
judicial review of BPC actions.  President de la Bastide and Jus-
tice Saunders concluded that “the presence of such ouster clauses
[will not deter courts] from inquiring into whether a body has per-
formed its functions in contravention of fundamental rights guar-
anteed by the Constitution, and in particular the right to
procedural fairness.” Thus, judicial review is appropriate when
the procedures of the BPC affect procedural fairness and could
result in the “breach of the respondents’ right to the protection of
the law, one of the fundamental human rights.”94
The next issue, whether the BPC was required to await the
outcome of the petition to the Commission, ultimately led the
90. Joseph, supra note 4, at ¶ 30 (citing de Freitas v. Benny, (1976) AC 239; (1975)
27 WIR 318).
91. Id. ¶ 30. The Justices added: “In light of these developments, the exercise of
the prerogative of mercy has fallen under greater scrutiny, especially in those states
whose Constitutions permit, or specifically sanction, retention of the mandatory death
penalty for the crime of murder. The occasion on which the prerogative of mercy is
exercised is the final, and in mandatory death penalty regimes, the only, opportunity
a convicted murderer has to point to the particular circumstances of his case and to
argue by reference to them that he should not be executed. Whether he is or is not
ultimately put to death by the State depends not just on the substantive exercise of
the prerogative of mercy but also on the procedures governing and leading up to its
exercise. The quality and nature of the advice given to the Governor-General bear a
direct relationship to the quality and nature of the process followed by the BPC in
coming to its decision.” Id. at ¶ 31.
92. Id. ¶ 36 (referencing Lewis v. Attorney General of Jamaica, [2001] 2 A.C. 50
(P.C.) (appeal taken from Jam.)).
93. Id. ¶ 39.
94. Id. ¶ 41.
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court “to examine the judgments of the JCPC that specifically
address the position of a condemned man seeking to take advan-
tage of provisions in a ratified but unincorporated human rights
treaty.”95  To address this issue, the CCJ identified the legitimate
expectation doctrine as a means to establish the legal impact of
unincorporated treaty obligations.96
After reviewing a number of cases concerning the effect of
unincorporated treaties on domestic law, the CCJ found that it
was the government’s statements and actions that created a legiti-
mate expectation that the BPC would await the outcome the
Inter-American Court proceedings. The court opined that “the
facts and circumstances that could have given rise to the legiti-
mate expectation” included “[1] the fact that Barbados had ratified
the ACHR, [2] positive statements . . . made by representatives of
the Executive authority . . . to abide by that treaty . . .  [and] [3]
the practice of the Barbados Government to give an opportunity to
condemned men to have their petitions to the international
human rights body processed before proceeding to execution.”97
The court stated that accordingly,  “[i]n all these circumstances we
would hold that the respondents had a legitimate expectation that
the State would not execute them without first allowing them a
reasonable time within which to complete the proceedings they
had initiated under the ACHR by petition to the Commission.”98
Justices de la Bastide and Saunders likened the denial of a
legitimate expectation to an abuse of discretion or a lack of fair-
ness. Along these lines, the Justices created a balancing test to
determine whether or not a legitimate expectation has risen. In
this test, “[t]he court must weigh the competing interests of the
individual . . . and that of the public authority . . . [and] must
make an assessment of how to strike the balance or be prepared to
review the fairness of any such assessment . . . previously [made]
by the public authority.“99 In applying this balancing test to the
facts in the Boyce case, the court explained,
In the case before us, there is on the one hand the legiti-
mate expectation of the condemned men that they will be
permitted a reasonable time to pursue their petitions with
95. Id. ¶ 44.
96. In construing the concept of “legitimate expectation,” the CCJ referred to
Minister of State for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v. Teoh, [1995] 183 C.L.R 273
(Austl.).
97. Joseph, supra note 4, at ¶ 118.
98. Id.
99. Id. ¶ 124.
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the Commission . . .. On the other hand, there is whatever
the State may advance as an overriding interest in refusing
to await completion of the international process before car-
rying out the death sentence. . .. [A]part from the con-
straints of the Pratt time-limit, the State of Barbados
claims no overriding interest in putting the condemned
men to death without allowing their legitimate expectation
to be fulfilled.100
The Justices also noted the respondents’ legitimate expecta-
tion that the procedure “allowed a reasonable time to pursue their
petitions and receive a favorable‘ report from the international
body” but did not include an expectation that “the BPC [would]
abide by the recommendations in the report.”101 Significantly, the
CCJ limited the legitimate expectation approach as a means of
invoking unincorporated treaty rights.  The Justices stated that
“the doctrine of legitimate expectation in this case is rooted in a
number of considerations” including “the desirability of giving the
condemned man every opportunity to secure the commutation of
his sentence, the direct access which the treaty affords him to the
international law process and the disproportion between giving
effect to the State’s interest in avoiding delay . . . and the finality
of an execution.”102
CONCLUSION
As shown in the Boyce-Joseph Cases, the MDP in Barbados is
constitutional, but subject to significant domestic and interna-
tional safeguards.  While the Barbadian MDP is preserved by the
savings law provision in Section 26 of the Barbados Constitution,
the implementation this sentence invokes a number of post-sen-
tencing protections.  Thus both the JCPC and CCJ have shown
that international obligations may be considered in the meticulous
judicial mechanics of the MDP.  These obligations constrain the
actions of the Barbados Privy Council and serve to alleviate the
nullification of fundamental rights under the savings clause provi-
sions.  As a result, the JCPC and now the CCJ have forged the
time limitations on domestic appeals and upheld the right to
appeal to international bodies in an effort to ensure procedural
integrity of the MDP.  The resulting precedents have resulted in a
100. Id. ¶ 125.
101. Id.
102. Joseph, supra note 4, at ¶ 131.
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de facto repeal of the MDP in Barbados103 and other Common-
wealth Caribbean countries through the diligent infusion of due
process and human rights principles into post sentencing
mandatory penalty death proceedings.
103. The Attorney General of Barbados, Adriel Brathwaite, has announced that
Barbados would formally abolish its mandatory death penalty and noted that no
killer had been executed in Barbados since 1984. David McFadden, Barbados AG
Says Mandatory Death Penalty to End, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 25, 2014, available at
http://start.new.toshiba.com/news/read/category/Latin%20America%20and%20
Caribbean%20News/article/the_associated_press-Barbados_ag_says_mandatory_
death_penalty_to_end-ap. As of January 2015, two bills to abolish the mandatory
death penalty were before the House of Assembly—Constitution (Amendment) Bill,
2014, and the Offences Against the Person (Amendment) Bill, 2014.
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